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Note on a generalized wage rigidity result 
 
1. Introduction 
The empirically observed wage rigidity has attracted attention of the researchers 
working on Industrial Organization and Labor Economics. Recently, Dhillon and 
Petrakis (2002) show that, under fairly general conditions, if there is a centralized 
labor union, the equilibrium wag rates do not depend on the number of firms and 
product differentiation.
1 Considering Cournot competition, this note extends this line 
of research with asymmetry in firms. 
We show that if the firms differ in labor productivities, the equilibrium wage 
rates under a centralized labor union are not independent of the number of firms and 
product differentiation if the labor union charges a uniform wage rate. However, if the 
centralized labor union can discriminate wage rate between the firms, the equilibrium 
wage rates do not depend of the number of firms and product differentiation. Hence, 
the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) may not be robust with respect 
to the asymmetry in firms, which is perhaps more common than symmetry considered 
by them. 
It is well-known that an upstream agent will prefer price discrimination over 
uniform pricing if there are differences in the downstream agents (Yoshida, 2000). 
Hence, it is arguable that a labor union may prefer to charge different wages to 
different firms if there is asymmetry between the firms. However, empirical evidences 
suggest that in many situations a labor union charges uniform wage rate irrespective of 
the differences between the firms. As discussed in Haucap et al. (2000 and 2001), a 
                                                 
1 The irrelevance of the number of downstream firms on the upstream input price can also be found in 
the earlier works by Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Tyagi (1999).   2
common feature of many labor markets in continental Europe is “coverage extension 
rules”, which implies that some or all employment terms are made generally binding 
for all industry participants and not only for the members of unions and employers’ 
associations. “In Germany, for example, collective wage agreements between a union 
and an employers’ association can be made compulsory even for independent 
employers through so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE) … The Ministry 
of Labor can, on application of either unions or employers’ associations, use an AVE 
to make some or all terms of a collectively negotiated employment contract generally 
binding for an entire industry, where otherwise only those unions, employers and 
employers’ associations that have actually negotiated and signed the contract would be 
directly bound by it (§3 I TVG)” (Haucap et al., 2001). It is also noted in Haucap et al. 
(2001) that the number of AVEs almost continuously increased from 448 in 1975 to 
588 in 1998.
2 Thus, it justifies our analysis with uniform wage setting by a centralized 
labor union.
3 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Since, in presence of asymmetry between the firms, the calculations for showing the 
effects of the number of firms and product differentiation are cumbersome, we show 
these effects separately. In section 2.1, we consider the case of a homogeneous 
                                                 
2 Haucap et al. (2001) also show when the labor union may prefer a uniform wage over discriminatory 
wage. 
3 The wage bargaining by the labor union for the UK Universities may also support the uniform wage 
setting by a centralized labor union in presence of productivity differences. While the people working 
in different Universities may differ in productivities, the national labor union bargains for similar wage 
rates for all the UK Universities.   3
product and show the effects of the number of firms. In section 2.2, we consider a 
duopoly market structure and show the effects of product differentiation. 
 
2.1. The effects of the number of firms 
Let us consider an economy with  ) ( m n+  firms producing a homogeneous product. 
Assume that production requires only labor. For notational convenience arrange the 
firms as  m n n n n + + + ,..., 2 , 1 , ,... 2 , 1 . Without loss of generality, assume that the each 
of the firms in  ] , 1 [ n  requires one labor to produce one unit of output, while each of the 




λ . Hence, we consider asymmetry in labor productivities of the firms. Also, to 
make asymmetry meaningful in our analysis, assume that  1 ≥ n  and  1 ≥ m . 
Assume that the inverse market demand function for the product is  
q a P − = ,             ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. To provide counter examples to Dhillon and 
Petrakis (2002), it will be enough to focus on a particular demand function. 
  We assume that there is a centralized labor union that sets the wage rates for 
the firms. We will consider two possibilities: (i) where the labor union sets a uniform 
wage rate for all firms, and (ii) where the labor union can charge different wage rates 
to different firms. Following Haucap and Wey (2004), we can call the former wage 
setting behavior as “centralization” and the latter as “coordination”. As a 
simplification, we assume that the reservation wage rates of the labors are zero. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the labor union sets the wage 
rates. At stage 2, the firms produce like Cournot oligopolists and the profits are 
realized. We solve the game through backward induction.   4
Hence, we consider the case of a monopoly labor union as in Dunlop (1944) 
and Oswald (1982). Since, the purpose of this paper is to show that, under a 
centralized labor union, the equilibrium wage rates can depend on the number of firms 
and product differentiation in presence of asymmetric firms, it is enough for us to 
consider a monopoly labor union. However, note that our qualitative results holds 
even if there is bargaining between the labor union and the firms. Bargaining between 
the labor union and the firms will only complicate the calculations without adding 
much to the main purpose of the paper. Further, to make our point, we concentrate on 
the right-to-manage model of labor union, which is perhaps the most widely used 
model of labor union in the Industrial Organization literature.
4 
 
2.1.1. Uniform wage setting by the labor union 
In this subsection we assume that the labor union charges a uniform wage rate to all 
firms. 
  Given the demand function and the uniform wage rate w, the equilibrium 
output of each of the firms in  ] , 1 [ n  is 
) 1 (
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  Therefore, the labor union maximizes the following expression to determine 
the wage rate:
5 
                                                 
4 See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favor of right-to-manage models.  
5 It is important to note that, due to asymmetry among the firms, the labor union may not wish to serve 
all the firms. Hence, the labor union may charge a sufficiently high wage rate that encourages only the 
relatively efficient firms to hire labors and producing the product. However, it can be shown that the 
labor union prefers to serve all the firms if λ  is not sufficiently different from 1. Since, the wage 
determination in presence of asymmetry is the main element of this paper, we do our analysis under the 
assumption that λ  is sufficiently close to 1 so that the labor union serves all the firms and solves the 
maximization problem (2).   5
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The equilibrium wage rate is 
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,          ( 3 )  
which clearly shows that equilibrium wage rate depends on the number of firms. Note 
that 
* w  is independent of the number of firms if either  1 = λ  or  0 = n  or  0 = m . 
  Hence, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 1: If there is a centralized labor union that sets a uniform wage rate for 
all firms, the equilibrium wage rate depends on the number of firms if the firms differ 
in labor productivities. 
 
  The reason for the above result follows easily from Dhillon and Petrakis 
(2002). They show that, if the firm’s equilibrium output and profit are log-linear in the 
wage rate and the market features such as the number of firms and product 
differentiation, the equilibrium wage rate is independent of the market features. If the 
firms are asymmetric in labor productivities, it is immediate from the above analysis 
that the firm’s equilibrium output and the profit
6 is not log-linear in the wage rate and 
the number of firms, and therefore, the equilibrium wage rate depends on the number 
of firms. It is important to note that, like Dhillon and Petrakis (2002), we have also 
considered that the production technologies of the firms are log-linear and the union 
utility is log-linear in wage rate and aggregate employment. However, the asymmetry 
between the firms does not satisfy that the firm’s equilibrium output and the profit are 
log-linear in the wage rate and the number of firms.   6
  Let us now see the effects of the number of firms on the equilibrium wage rate. 
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6 It is easy to check that the profit of the i th firm is 
2
i q ,  m n i + = ,..., 2 , 1 . 







 if  2 > λ , we will not 
focus on the higher values of λ , since as mentioned in footnote 5, the labor union would serve only 
the relatively efficient firm for higher values of λ . For example, it is easy to show that if  1 > λ , 
1 = = m n  and the centralized labor union charges a uniform wage rate to all firms, then the labor 
union prefers to serve both firms instead of serving only the firm with higher labor productivity 
provided  2 < λ . When  1 , > m n , the relevant values of λ  for which the labor union serves all the 
firms are less than  ) (
* n λ  that is lower than 2 . So, for  1 , > m n , we need to restrict λ  between 1 
and  ) (
* n λ . 
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.                  Q.E.D. 
 
  The reason for the above result is easy to understand. The presence of 
asymmetric firms makes the total labor demand curve as a kinked function, and the 
kink occurs at that wage rate where the firms with relatively lower labor productivities 
do not find it profitable to produce. 
Let us now consider Proposition 2(i). If  1 < λ , then, in our analysis, the firms 







) 1 ( λ
. An increase in n implies that the number of inefficient firms 
increases, which makes the segment of the labor demand curve, where all firms find 
production profitable, more elastic, but does not affect w. This is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Assume that the total labor demand curve for a given  1 < λ , n and m  is given by the 
kinked curve  ABC . The wage rate w is the wage rate at which the labor demand by 
the lower productive firms is zero. The labor demand is coming from all the firms on 
the segment BC , while, on the segment  AB , the labor demand is coming only from 
the firms with higher labor productivities, i.e., from the firms in  ] , 1 [ m n n + + . Now, if 
n increases, it rotates BC  to  ' BC , and makes this segment more elastic. As a result, 
the equilibrium wage rate reduces with n.   8
However, if  1 > λ , then, the firms in  ] , 1 [ n  are relatively efficient, and these 









. If n increases, it shifts the segment of 
the labor demand curve above  ' w  outward. However, higher n also implies that  ' w   
falls, since, now the inefficient firms are facing competition from more efficient firms. 
Hence, in this situation, higher n not only shifts the labor demand curve outward, it 
also reduces the critical level of the wage rate at which kink occurs. This is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
 Assume that the labor demand curve for a given  1 > λ ,  n and m  is given by the 
kinked curve MNP . The wage rate  ' w  is the wage rate at which the labor demand by 
the lower productive firms is zero. Now, if n increases, it shifts the labor demand 
curve to  ' 'P MN , and the kink occurs at " w . So, while the outward shift of the labor 
demand curve tends to increase the equilibrium wage rate, the fall of  ' w  to  " w  tends 
to reduce the equilibrium wage rate. Hence, the net effect of a change in n depends on 
the number of inefficient firms and the labor productivities of the inefficient firms. 
  Similar argument follows for the case of Proposition 2(ii). 
 
2.1.2. Wage discrimination 
We have shown that the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) does not 
hold if the centralized labor union sets a uniform wage rate and the firms differ in 
labor productivities. Hence, the previous section provides a counter example to their 
results when the centralized labor union needs to charge a uniform wage rate to all 
firms (may be due to the institutional set up as mentioned in the introduction).   9
In this section we show that if the centralized union keeps the flexibility of 
charging different wage rates to different firms, the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and 
Petrakis (2002) holds in presence of the asymmetric firms. Let us now consider wage 
discrimination between the firms. Given the wage rates, the equilibrium output 
of each of the firms in  ] , 1 [ n  is 
) 1 (
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  Therefore, the labor union maximizes the following expression to determine 
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The equilibrium wage rates are 
2
* a
wi = ,  n i ..., 2 , 1 = , and 
λ 2
* a
wj = ,  m n n j + + = ,..., 1.  
  Hence, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 3: If a centralized labor union can discriminate wage rate between the 
firms, the equilibrium wage rates are independent of the number of firms even if the 
firms differ in labor productivities. 
 
  If the union discriminates wage rate between the firms, it considers the labor 
demand of different firms separately. Hence, it is important to see whether, in the 
firm’s output and the profit, the firm’s own wage rate and market features such as the   10
number of firms behave like a log-linear function. It follows from the above analysis 
that, in the firm’s equilibrium output and profit, the firm’s own wage rate and the 
number of firms behave like a log-linear function. As a result, the equilibrium wage 
rate of each firm is independent of the number of firms.  
 
2.2. The effects of product differentiation 
Let us now consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly market structure. Assume 
that firm 1 requires one labor to produce one unit of output, and firm 2 requires λ   
labors to produce one unit of output. Like section 2.1, we assume that the reservation 
wage rates for the labors are zero. 
  Assume that the inverse market demand function for firm i is 
  j i i q q a P γ − − = ,  j i ≠ ,           ( 7 )  
where  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ γ  shows the degree of product differentiation.  0 = γ  implies that the 
products are isolated, while  1 = γ  implies that the products are homogeneous. 
 
2.2.1. Uniform wage setting 
Let us first consider the situation where the centralized labor union sets a uniform 
wage rate for both firms. Given the demand specification and the uniform wage rate 
w, the equilibrium outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively 
) 4 (







q  and 
) 4 (













) 2 ) 2 ( ( ) 2 ) 2 ( (
2 γ
γ λ γ λ γλ γ
−
+ − − + + − − w w a w w w a w
Max
w .      (8)   11
The equilibrium wage rate is 
) 1 ( 4

















  Hence the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 4: If the firms differ in labor productivities and a centralized labor union 
charges uniform wage rate to the firms, the equilibrium wage rate depends on the 
degree of product differentiation. As the degree of product differentiation increases 
(i.e., γ  falls), the equilibrium wage rate increases.  
 
  The intuition of this result is similar to the intuition provided in subsection 
2.1.1. 
 
2.2.2. Wage discrimination 
Let us now consider the situation where the labor union discriminates wage between 
the firms. Given that the labor union charges  1 w  and  2 w  to firms 1 and 2 respectively, 
the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are respectively 
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w = . 
  Hence, the proposition is immediate. 
                                                                                                                                            
9 The qualification made in footnote 5 also holds for the subsection 2.2.    12
 
Proposition 5: If a centralized labor union can discriminate wage between the firms, 
the equilibrium wage rates are independent of the degree of product differentiation 
even if the firms differ in labor productivities. 
 




Considering Cournot competition, this note shows that if the firms differ in labor 
productivities and the centralized labor union needs to charge a uniform wage rate to 
the firms, the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) does not hold. The 
asymmetry between the firms does not satisfy that the firm’s output and profit is log-
linear in the wage rate and the market features such as the number of firms and 
product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium wage rate depends on the number 
of firms and product differentiation. Hence, the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and 
Petrakis (2002) may not be robust with respect to the asymmetry in firms, which is 
perhaps more common than symmetry considered by them. 
However, if the centralized labor union can discriminate wage between the 
firms, the wage rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) holds even if the firms 
differ in labor productivities. In this situation, in the firm’s equilibrium output and 
profit, the firm’s own wage rate and the market features such as the number of firms 
and product differentiation behave like a log-linear function. 
 
   13
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Figure 2: The effect of a higher n when  1 > λ . 
 